Adversarial Attacks on Probabilistic Autoregressive Forecasting Models

ICML 2020

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Neural architectures with stochastic behavior



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

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

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

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

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- Multiple sources of noise: (i) each timestep, (ii) each weight[1]

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

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

(ii) Bayesian neural network

- Multiple sources of noise: (i) each timestep, (ii) each weight[1]
- Complex resulting output distribution, approximated via Monte-Carlo sampling

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Focus of this work: probabilistic forecasting models

- Stochastic sequence model
- Generates several prediction traces



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

Traditionally used as a generative model



WaveNet for raw audio



Handwriting generation

Probabilistic forecasting models for decision-making[2]

- Allows to predict volatility of the time-series.
- Useful with low signal-to-noise ratio.

Key idea: use generated traces as Monte-Carlo samples to estimate the evolution of the time-series

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Stock prices

Electricity consumption

amazon

Business sales

Integrated in **Amazon Sagemaker** (DeepAR architecture)

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Contributions

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We aim at providing an **off-the-shelf methodology** for these attacks

Class of attack objectives

Stochastic model with input x, and output $y \sim q_x(\cdot)$.
Previously considered attack objectives:

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Untargeted attacks on information divergence D with the original predicted distribution

$$\max_{\delta} D\left(q_{x+\delta} \| q_x\right)$$



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



Untargeted/Targeted attacks on the mean of the distribution

$$\min_{\delta} \text{distance}\left(\mathbb{E}_{q_{x+\delta}}[y], \text{target}\right)$$

Framework

We perform a targeted attack on a **statistic** $\chi(y)$ of the output.

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Extensions:

- Bayesian setting $q_x(y|z)$.
- Generalization to simultaneous attack of several statistics.
- Statistics depending on x.

Motivation 1: option pricing in finance

Consider a stock with

- past prices $x = (p_1, \ldots, p_{t-1})$
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European call option	$\max(0, y_h)$	
Asian call option	$\mathrm{average}_i(y_i)$	
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Our framework allows to specifically target one of these options

Motivation 2: attacking model uncertainty

Some defenses use **prediction uncertainty**
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New attacks bypass these defenses by enforcing
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Our framework allows to express these constraints, with

- The entropy $\mathbb{E}_{q_x}[-\log(q[y|x])]$.
- The distribution's moments $\mathbb{E}_{q_x}[y^k]$.

Details about the estimators

Technical challenge

Gradient-based attacks require computing

$$\nabla_{\boldsymbol{\delta}} \mathbb{E}_{q[\boldsymbol{y}|\boldsymbol{x}+\boldsymbol{\delta},z]}[\chi(\boldsymbol{y})]$$

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The expectation and its gradient have no analytical closed form

We provide two different estimators to approximate the gradient

Approach 1: REINFORCE

- A.k.a as log-derivative trick and score-function estimator.
- Based on interversion of expectation and derivative.

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$$\nabla_{\boldsymbol{\delta}} \mathbb{E}_{q[\boldsymbol{y}|\boldsymbol{x}+\boldsymbol{\delta},z]}[\chi(\boldsymbol{y})]$$
$$\simeq \frac{\sum_{l=1}^{L} \chi(\boldsymbol{y}^l) q[z|\boldsymbol{x}+\boldsymbol{\delta},\boldsymbol{y}^l] \nabla_{\boldsymbol{\delta}} \log(q[\boldsymbol{y}^l|\boldsymbol{x}+\boldsymbol{\delta},z])}{\sum_{l=1}^{L} q[z|\boldsymbol{x}+\boldsymbol{\delta},\boldsymbol{y}^l]}$$

REINFORCE estimator

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Approach 2: Reparametrization

- Mitigates the high-variance of REINFORCE.
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- Assumes a reparametrization $y \sim g(x, \eta)$, where g is deterministic.

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\begin{aligned}
&\nabla_{\boldsymbol{\delta}} \mathbb{E}_{q[\boldsymbol{y}|\boldsymbol{x}+\boldsymbol{\delta},z]}[\chi(\boldsymbol{y})] \\
\simeq &\nabla_{\boldsymbol{\delta}} \left(\frac{\sum_{l=1}^{L} \chi(g_{\boldsymbol{x}}(\boldsymbol{\delta}, \boldsymbol{\eta}^l)) q[z|\boldsymbol{x}+\boldsymbol{\delta}, g_{\boldsymbol{x}}(\boldsymbol{\delta}, \boldsymbol{\eta}^l)]}{\sum_{l=1}^{L} q[z|\boldsymbol{x}+\boldsymbol{\delta}, g_{\boldsymbol{x}}(\boldsymbol{\delta}, \boldsymbol{\eta}^l)]} \right)
\end{aligned}
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Reparametrization estimator

.

Comparison

Respective advantages of gradient estimators.

Method	REINFORCE	Reparametrization
Applies to non-differentiable statistics	✔	
Requires no reparametrization	✔	
Applies to Bayesian setting		✔
Yields best gradient estimates		✔

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Detailed comparison and conditions in the paper!

Experimental evaluation

Experiments: stock prices

Algorithmic trading scenario, standard additive threat model, maximum Euclidean norm of 0.1[3] for the perturbation.

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

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Experiments: electricity

Original test samples (red) and adversarial examples (blue) for prediction of electricity consumption.



Thanks for listening

Code and trained models are available at

`github.com/eth-sri/probabilistic-forecasts-attacks`

Contact at

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